Introduction
There is an ongoing methodological debate about the appropriate way to take account of future health effects in evaluations. The majority view, most recently and comprehensively expounded in Lipscomb, Weinstein and Torrence (1995) , is that benefits and costs should be discounted at the same rate. The view dominates the recommendations on discounting by government agencies, regulatory bodies, learned journals and leading health economics texts (Smith and Gravelle, 2000) . A smaller body of literature favours a lower rate for health effects than for costs. The most influential example is Parsonage and Neuburger (1992) , written by two UK government economists and later reflected in the UK Department of Health recommendations for evaluation of health affecting interventions (Department of Health, 1996) .
We suggest in this paper that at least some of the differences between the two schools of thought arise from different implicit assumptions about the decision context. We show in section 2 that cost benefit analysis (CBA) of interventions affecting health requires procedures which directly or indirectly are equivalent to discounting the value of future health effects at the same rate as costs (Cropper and Portney, 1990; Cropper and Sussman, 1990; Jones-Lee and Loomes, 1995) . In cost effectiveness analysis (CEA), where health effects are measured in volume rather than value terms, one valid method of allowing for growth in the value of future health effects is to discount the volume of future health effects at r h = r c -g v , where r c is the discount rate applied to costs and g v the rate of growth of the value of a unit of health. An equivalent procedure in CEA is to adjust the volume of health effects by g v and to discount at the same rate as costs. Thus, providing the context is correctly specified and account properly taken of the changing value of health, the two views can be reconciled. Unfortunately, the preponderance of official and semi-official recommendations for CEA is to use the same discount rate for costs and benefits and not to adjust the volume of health effects to allow for the growth in their value (Smith and Gravelle, 2000) .
One barrier to reconciliation of the two views on discounting is the paradox set out in Keeler and Cretin (1983) . They show that under CEA certain types of worthwhile projects will be indefinitely postponed unless the same discount rate is used for costs and health effects. Previous responses to the Keeler-Cretin paradox have argued that such projects are very peculiar and never occur in practice or that the paradox does not arise if constraints on funding in any period are recognised (Parsonage and Neuburger, 1992; van Hout, 1998) . But the discounting procedure used in assessing projects should give the correct answer irrespective of the project. The Keeler-Cretin paradox points to a logical problem with using different discount rates for costs and health effects in CEA and cannot be dismissed on empirical or practical grounds. We demonstrate in section 3 that the Keeler-Cretin paradox reveals a fundamental difficulty with CEA, though not with CBA. It does not arise because of the use of different discount rates for costs and health effects. The paradox is simply irrelevant to the choice of discount rate for health effects.
The crucial issue is whether the value of health effects is constant over time. A number of authors (Parsonage and Neuburger, 1992; Viscusi, 1995; van Hout, 1998; Brouwer, van Hout and Rutten, 2000) have suggested that the value of health grows over time and that as a consequence the discount rate on health effects should be less than the discount rate on costs. Lipscomb, Weinstein and Torrence (1995) are the most influential proponents of the majority view that costs and health effects should be discounted at the same rate in CEA. They recognise the possibility that the value of health may be increasing over time and its implications for discounting health effects. But they conclude that "the case for such global adjustments in CEA conducted from a societal perspective has yet to be fully made, in our judgement." (Lipscomb, Weinstein and Torrence, 1995, page 234.) Their reluctance to accept the implications of a positive growth rate in the value of health may in part be due to the absence in the literature to date of arguments based on explicit models with conventional assumptions.
Accordingly, we set out in section 4 two simple models to underpin the more informal arguments which suggest that the value of health grows over time. The first is based on a behavioural model of individual choice of health affecting activities. The second uses the social welfare framework familiar from discussions of the choice of the social discount rate (Layard and Glaister, 1994, Introduction) . The framework has been used to argue that the discount rate to be applied to future income changes should be r c = ρ + gε, where ρ is the rate of discount applied to future utility, g is the growth rate in income and ε is the elasticity of the marginal utility of income.
We extend the social welfare framework to incorporate health which is valued in its own right and which may affect income. We show that the rate of growth of the value of health (g v ) is a weighted average of the rate of growth of the direct utility effect of health (k), the rate of growth of income g, and the rate of growth of income times the elasticity of marginal utility of income (gε). The weights depend on the extent to which the income loss from ill health is borne by the individual or is covered by insurance.
If health has no effect on income and the utility effect of health is constant over time, the value of future health effects in terms of future income grows at the rate at which at the marginal utility of income falls over time: g v = gε. As a consequence the only reason for discounting future health effects would be that future utility is intrinsically less valuable. The discount rate on health effects (r h ) would be the rate at which future utility is discounted: r r g h c v = − = ρ < r c . In another special case, when health affects income but had no direct utility effect, g v is equal to the growth rate in income g and the discount rate on health effects is c h r g r
Typically it is suggested (Arrow, 1995) that ρ is about 1%, ε around 2 and g is 2% to 2.5%, yielding discount rates on costs of 5% to 6%. The discount rate on health effects in the two special cases is about 1% when health has no effect on income and about 3% to 3.5% when it only affects income. Allowing for such differences between discount rates on health and costs can have marked implications for rankings of interventions (Parsonage and Neuburger, 1992) and it is important that the correct discounting procedures be used. But the overwhelming majority of published CEAs of health care interventions use the same discount rate for health and costs (Smith and Gravelle, 2000) . We hope that the arguments in the current paper will help to convince evaluators of the need to take account of the implications of the growth in the value of health for their choice of discount rate.
Discounting for decision making: two equivalent procedures
Decisions about interventions with consequences for time streams of costs (reductions in income) and health requires a set of judgements about the relative values of health and income at different dates. Consider a two period example of an intervention which changes present and future costs by ∆c 0 and ∆c 1 and the quantities of present and future health by ∆h 0 and ∆h 1 . We can summarise value judgements or social preferences over income and health streams in a social welfare function ) , , , (
where y t , h t are income and health in period t (Jones- Lee and Loomes, 1995) . The welfare function embodies judgements which determine the rate at which we are willing to sacrifice one good (health or income at some date) for another.
The marginal social valuation of health in period t in terms of period t income is the rate at which we are willing to give up period t income in exchange for period t health. It is the (negative of) the social marginal rate substitution between income and health in period t: 
and the marginal value of future health in terms of current health
The value judgements embodied in W define the social rate of discount on income or costs r c in terms of the willingness to sacrifice current income for future income and the social rate of discount on health r h in terms of the willingness to sacrifice current health for future health. In general, the marginal social welfare from changes in health or income in any period depend on both income and health in that period and possibly on income and health in other periods. Until we specify both the form of the welfare function and the levels of health and income we do not know whether r c is greater or less than r h .
1 Figure 1 is illustrates these definitions. Although there are four marginal valuations in the two period case (
) they are not independent: once three of them are specified the other is determined. Consistency requires that the marginal value of one good (health or income) in terms of another is the same whatever the route by which they are compared.
Cost benefit analysis
To decide whether an intervention is worthwhile the marginal social valuations are used to convert all the consequences into equivalent amounts of a common unit of account (income or health at some date). Conventionally the unit of account is income in the present period. ∆c 1 , ∆h 0 and ∆h 1 must be converted into equivalent changes in ∆c 0 which are summed to give the present value of the intervention.
Such cost benefit analysis (CBA) is not the prevalent form of evaluation in health economics because of the difficulty in valuing health effects. However it is instructive to start with an outline of discounting in CBA because it has an explicit welfare theoretic foundation.
The present value of the intervention can be derived in two equivalent ways. The direct procedure values health effects in each period in terms of income of that period and then discounts the future value at the rate of interest on income r c . The present value of the intervention under the direct procedure is v h r v h c r c c c
The indirect method of calculating the present value of the intervention differs from the direct procedure in its treatment of ∆h 1 . It converts the change in future health into an equivalent change in current health and then applies the value of current health in terms of current income. The present value of the intervention with the indirect procedure is 
Since the two procedures are equivalent (4) and (5) The discount rates on health and costs are the same (r h = r c ) only if the value of health in a period in terms of income in that period is the same in both periods (v 1 = v 0 ). If the value placed on health grows over time (v 0 < v 1 ) then there must be a lower discount rate on health effects than on income or costs (r h < r c ) and vice versa. 
Some of the disagreements over discounting of health effects may arise from a failure to spell out
• whether one is referring to discounting of the value of health effects (v 1 ∆h 1 ) in a future period in terms of the income of that period or to the quantity of future health effects (∆h 1 ) • what is being assumed about the rate of growth of the value of health effects (g v ).
When the value of health effects is discounted the rate of discount for income r c should be used. If the volume of health effects is discounted the rate of discount for health effects r h is correct. The discount rate on the quantity of health effects is less than the discount rate on costs (r h < r c ) if the growth rate in the value of health is positive (g v > 0).
The two procedures require exactly the same information and judgements about the marginal valuations of future cost and health effects in terms of present income. The first procedure, valuing heath in a period in terms of the income of that period and then applying the discount rate appropriate for incomes is perhaps more intuitive. It is also in line with the recommendations of Feldstein (1972) . Feldstein suggested that when an intervention has complicated consequences because of its knock on effects on future investment, all the effects of an intervention be expressed in terms of consumption changes which are then discounted at the rate of discount appropriate for consumption.
Discounting in CEA
In cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) the investigator is limited to quantifying the health effects and does not place a monetary value on them. The aim is derive an incremental cost effectiveness ratio (ICER) for the intervention, defined as the discounted present value of incremental costs divided by the discounted sum of incremental health effects.
When projects are mutually exclusive and questions of the scale or divisibility of projects can be ignored, interventions with lower ICERs are preferred to those with higher ICERs. Interventions should be undertaken when their ICER is less than some critical value λ:
The crucial issue, over which most of the debate in the health economics literature on discounting of health effects has focused, is the discount rate r h o to be applied to health effects in CEA to calculate the ICER.
The CEA criterion is used when there is insufficient information on the value of health effects to conduct a CBA. It seems reasonable to require that the CEA criterion would yield the same decisions as CBA if there was information on the value of health effects. 2 CBA would accept projects whose discounted present value, given by (4) or (5), is positive. Rearranging the ICER decision rule (8) the project is accepted under CEA if
Using (6) and (4) or (5), the ICER criterion is equivalent to the CBA decision rule if and only if
Hence in cost effectiveness analysis health effects should be discounted at the rate r h o = r h ≈ r c -g v . The same discount rate should be applied to health effects in CEA as in the indirect procedure under CBA. 3 We argue in section 4 that the value of future health in terms of future income grows over time (g v > 0), so that future health effects should be discounted at a lower rate than costs if no adjustment is made to the volume of health effects to reflect their growing value over time.
The alternative, direct, way to take account of the changing value of future health effects in CEA is to adjust the quantity of effects. The "real" quantity of future health effects can be defined as
where θ 1 is an adjustment factor to allow for the change in the value of future effects. The CEA rule with the same discount rate applied to costs and to the "real" quantity of health effects is to accept the project if:
which is equivalent to the CBA rule if
The implications of growth in the value of health for CEA are recognised in the literature (Lipscomb, Weinstein and Torrance, 1996; Parsonage and Neuburger, 1992; Viscusi, 1995; van Hout, 1998) but have made no impact on CEA practice (Smith and Gravelle, 2000) . Viscusi (1995) and Parsonage and Neuburger (1992) suggest adjusting the discount rate to allow for the growth in the value of health effects. Lipscomb, Weinstein and Torrance (1995) favour direct adjustment of the volume of health effects. There are no logical grounds for preferring one approach to the other. The direct adjustment has the advantage of dealing with issue of the growth in the value of health explicitly and separating it from the issue of the rate of discount to be applied in CEA.
If the value of health is growing over time some method of allowing for it in CEA must be found. It is simply incorrect to use the same discount rate for health and cost effects if the value of health is growing. Unfortunately most of the official recommendations do not take account of the possibility that g v is positive and suggest that the same discount rate be used for costs and health effects (Smith and Gravelle, 2000) .
Inter and intra-generational discounting
In discussion of whether health effects occurring at date t+1 should be given the same weight as health effects occurring at date t, it is important to be clear about whether one is comparing the effects on individuals who will be aged a years at both dates (intergenerational effects) or individuals who will be aged a at date t and a+1 at date t+1 (intragenerational effects). The value v t of the health effects of an intervention may depend on the age of the individuals affected as well as the date at which they occur.
A number of authors have suggested a method discounting future health effects which distinguishes timing and generational aspects (Lipscomb, 1989; Cropper and Sussman, 1990) . The effects on individuals aged a at date t are discounted back to the birth date of the cohort at date t-a and then the discounted value at date t-a are discounted back to the decision data 0.
If the same discount rate is applied at both stages the procedure is equivalent to standard approaches. The procedure allows the possibility of using different discount rates in the two stages. For example, we might be willing to respect individuals' intertemporal preferences as regards changes in their health or income and use discount rates derived from studies of their behaviour to discount income and cost changes affecting them. But we may feel that they undervalue the welfare of future generations in their intertemporal decisions (Sen, 1967) and wish to use different interest rates when discounting their present values (at cohort birth dates) back to the present date. The two stage procedure provides a neat method of reconciling respect for individual preferences over decisions which affect them directly with a social concern for inter-generational equity.
Recognition of the distinction between inter and intra generational discounting does not alter the conclusions about the relationship between the discount rate for health effects and costs. Future health effects at date t accruing to individuals aged a should be taken into account by valuing them in terms of the income of aged a individuals at date t and then discounted back to date t-a at the rate used for income of aged a individuals at date t. The discount rate applied to the wealth of the cohort born at date a-t can then be applied to calculate the present value of the health effects.
3 Keeler-Cretin paradox Keeler and Cretin (1983) make a much cited argument for discounting health effects and costs at the same rate (r h o = r c ) in CEA. They consider the following timing problem. A single period project can be undertaken once only. The costs ∆c and health effects ∆h are the same whatever the period in which the project is undertaken. The decision problem is to choose now the period in which the project will undertaken. If the project is undertaken in period t the discounted present value of the cost is ∆c/(1+r c ) t and the discounted health effect is ∆h/(1+ r h o ) t . The ICER for the project undertaken at date t is 
which decreases with t if r h o < r c . If r h o < r c the ICER indicates that the project becomes more worthwhile the longer it is delayed. With an infinite time horizon the CEA criterion will lead to the project being deferred indefinitely even if it has a very favourable cost effectiveness ratio (∆c/∆h) if undertaken in the present period. Keeler and Cretin (1983) argue that, because the decision maker is "paralysed" if r h o < r c in such projects, it is correct to set r h o = r c in CEA. With r h o = r c the decision maker is indifferent as to the timing of the project using the ICER criterion and would be willing to pick a start date at random.
We disagree: the reason why Keeler-Cretin projects present difficulties under the CEA criterion is that the CEA decision rule is inherently incomplete and cannot cope with issues of the timing of decisions. The solution, suggested in Keeler and Cretin (1983) , of using the same discount rate on health and cost effects in CEA fails to address the underlying problem, which is in the CEA rule, not the rate of discount. Keeler-Cretin projects do not present a problem when the CBA decision rule is used and have no implications for the choice of discount rate to be used in CEA. 
which is equivalent, since
The behaviour of D t depends on the growth rate in the value of health effects. There are three possible ranges of g v with different implications for how D t varies over time and therefore for the optimal timing of the Keeler-Cretin project:
For small enough growth rates D t is negative for all t: the project should be done immediately in period 0. ≤ the decision maker would be "paralysed" under the CBA decision rule since the present value of the project increases the later it is undertaken. Case (iii) seems highly implausible since it implies that one should be willing to sacrifice an arbitrarily large amount of current income to achieve a perpetual increase in health from date in the future, no matter how distant and no matter how small the increase in health.
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The CEA rule with the Keeler-Cretin recommendation that the decision maker use a discount rate on health of r h o = r c leads to the decision maker being indifferent as to the start date for Keeler-Cretin projects. Only by chance will she then choose the correct start date.
If the decision maker confronted with Keeler-Cretin projects uses a CEA rule but with r h o = r h = r c -g v she will be indifferent as to the start date when g v = 0 since the discounted cost effectiveness ratio will be constant with respect to the start date. The correct decision is to undertake the project immediately. When g v > 0 she will be led to defer the decision indefinitely which is incorrect except in the highly implausible case in which r g c v ≤ . Hence the CEA rule will lead to decisions which are sub optimal in the sense of not maximising the discounted present value of the project.
Thus CEA leads to incorrect decisions with Keeler-Cretin projects, irrespective of the choice of discount rate. The Keeler-Cretin paradox points to a difficulty with CEA for certain rather unusual projects but is irrelevant for the debate about the appropriate rate of discount for health effects and cost effects. 6 We conclude that, as far as the choice of discount rates for health in CEA is concerned, this paradox is deceased.
Is the value of health constant over time?
The growth rate in the value of health effects g v is crucial for the choice of discount rate. We outline two models, one individualistic and one societal, to argue that the value of health grows over time.
Behavioural model
Individuals can alter their health, or their probability distributions over health states, through consumption of health care, their lifestyles (Burgess and Propper, 1998) and occupational choices (Viscusi and Moore, 1989; Moore and Viscusi, 1990) . We derive an expression for the value of health v t in terms of the individual's preferences, health technology and market prices and then consider how it changes over time.
Value of health
Since the literature has been summarised before (Johansson, 1995) , a unit increase in health permits a reduction in consumption of x by 1/h x whilst keeping health constant. An additional amount p/h x is freed to spend on other goods. There is also the effect of the reduction in x on utility. The price of the commodity p is observable but, even if the health care good had no direct effect on utility ( 0 = x y m ), the marginal effect of x on health must be known to calculate v. If the health care good also directly affects utility, the potentially observable p/h x will under or over state the marginal value of the health change. Pessimistic conclusions about using market prices to reveal the value individuals place on their health are unchanged even when we take account of insurance markets where they can trade income when well against income when sick or capital markets where they can trade income at one date for income at another (Gravelle, 2000) .
Growth in value of health
Attempts to value health by revealed or stated preference techniques yield a wide range of estimates. Such difficulties in measuring the value of health are one justification for cost effectiveness analysis. However, whilst CEA does not require that health be valued, it does require an estimate of the growth in the value health. Wide variations in the estimates of the value of health render estimates of its growth rate even more problematic.
Consider the expression (18) for the valuation of health by an individual who consumes health care. 7 Suppose that health care has no direct effect on utility (m y
. Even in this simple case v will change over time for three reasons: changes in the price of x, changes in amount of x consumed, and shifts in the health production function due to technical progress in health care. The optimal amount of care consumed will vary over time with the productivity of care, its price and income.
The growth rate in the value of health, when 0 = , , are elasticities of the consumption of health care with respect to its price, income and technology. The rate of growth in the value of health depends on three factors: the growth rate in the price of care, the rate of growth of health care consumption and its effect on the marginal productivity of care and the rate of technical progress and its effect on the marginal productivity of care.
The growth rate of the price of care is plausibly positive: g p > 0. The sign of the second term in (19) is ambiguous. Although the marginal productivity of health care is diminishing
), the terms in the bracket in the second term are plausibly of different signs:
consumption of care declines with its price, and increases with income. The effect of technical progress on the demand for care is ambiguous since the increase in the marginal productivity of care tends to increase demand and the increase in health to reduce it. The evidence suggests that the consumption of health care increases over time (Blomqvist and Carter, 1997) , so that the second factor (increases in health care reducing its marginal productivity) tends to increase the value of v = p/h x (x,s).
Because technical progress increases h x (x,s), the third factor tends to reduce g v which could be therefore be negative or positive. We need assumptions about the magnitudes of the terms in (19) as well as their signs.
A positive income elasticity of demand for health or health improving goods is neither sufficient nor necessary for the value of health to increase over time. However, if only income changes over time (19) reduces to
so that the growth rate in the value of health depends on the rate of growth of income (g > 0), the income elasticity of demand for health care which, from the increasing shares of income spent on health as income increases is greater than unity (e y x > 1 ), and the elasticity of the marginal productivity of health 0 < Estimating the growth rate in the value of health is clearly difficult, even in the simple case we examined here, but we believe that it is likely to be positive.
Welfare model
We can reach a similar conclusion using an entirely different approach in which we specify a social welfare function and use it derive the value of changes in future health in terms of future income and hence to derive the growth rate of the value of health. The approach is instructive because it is an extension of a well known framework for discussion of the rate of social time preference for consumption or income when only income enters the social welfare function and there is no uncertainty (Layard and Glaister, 1994). 9 Suppose that all individuals live for one period, are identical except for the period in which they live and there are an equal number of individuals in each period. The results are not materially different but are more complicated to derive when individuals live for more than one period (Gravelle, 2000) . The social welfare function can be written in per capita terms as
where the expected utility of the representative individual is )
The pure discount factor on utility β = 1/(1 + ρ) allows for the possibility that a change in the utility of a generation counts for less solely because it arises at a later date.
State f is the healthy or fit state in that the individual is better off in state f other things (income) being equal: u ft (y) > u dt (y). We can interpret t π as the probability of the health state in a world where health outcomes are independent or as the proportion of the population who are healthy. Endowed income when diseased is t y and when healthy is t t y l + where t l is the effect of ill health on income. We assume that endowed income in both states grows at the rate g.
To maintain comparability with the literature on the discount rate under certainty, assume that the utility functions have constant elasticity of marginal utility
where the elasticity of the marginal utility of income is ε − and if 1 > ε utility is bounded above. When φ = 1 the marginal utility of income is not directly dependent on the state:
, but there is a direct utility loss of K t from being in the unhealthy state. With 0 < φ < 1 marginal utility is smaller when ill than when healthy and the case in which the state d is death, rather than diseased could be allowed for with φ = 0.
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We use the welfare function to derive the discount rate on income (costs), the value of health in terms of income and the discount rate on health. We first illustrate the procedure for a simple case in which there is insurance and the marginal utility of income is not state dependent, so that the optimal insurance scheme is full cover against income losses from ill health. A planner who has access to an actuarially fair insurance scheme in each period chooses y ft , y dt to maximises W subject to the insurance pool breaking even in each period.
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The Lagrangean for the problem is
The first order conditions are
Given the assumption that the marginal utility of income is state independent, the optimal insurance scheme gives the insured an income in each state equal to expected income: The marginal social value of an additional unit of period t+1 income in terms of period t income (the income discount factor) is, using the envelope theorem on the Lagrangean (24) and remembering that β = 1/(1+ρ), the discount rate on income is
We have the standard result (Layard and Glaister, 1994 ) that the planner should discount future income relative to current income because it is less valuable. First, future utility is valued less highly per se than current utility (ρ). Second, the increase in future utility as income is transferred from the current to the future period is smaller than the reduction in current utility because income grows over time (g) and the marginal utility of falls as income increases (ε).
The same result can be derived for the case in which marginal utility is state dependent. It also holds if we drop the assumption of optimal insurance and reinterpret L as a social welfare function. In this case we also interpret ) )( 1 ( ) ( dt t t ft t t t y y y y − − + − + π π l as the expected surplus from a possibly suboptimal insurance scheme, and assume that a certain £1 has the same social value wherever it accrues:
Using the more general interpretation of (24) as a social welfare function, the period t value of an increase in health (an increase in the probability of the healthy state) in terms of income in period t is 
where I t is the gross amount of compensation the individual is paid if unhealthy (the amount of cover against ill health). An increase is health is valuable for two reasons: First, it raises utility directly (the first terms in the last expression in (29)). The value of the direct increase in utility in terms of current income depends on the size of the utility gain and on the marginal utility of income. At higher levels of income marginal utility is smaller and hence the monetary value of a given increase in health is greater.
Second, there is an increase in expected income because healthy individuals are more productive (the second and third terms in the last expression in (29)). The value of the increase in expected income depends on the insurance arrangements. If there is full cover insurance ( t t I l = ) so that individual gets the same income whether healthy or ill all the productivity gain accrues entirely via the last term and is equal to the increase in expected income. If insurance is incomplete ( t t I l < ) some of the gain accrues to the individuals because they have a greater probability of being in the healthy state where they have a higher income.
Using (29) we get
where
and k is the rate of growth of K t the direct utility gain from better health. The marginal value of health (29) at any date depends on four factors: the direct impact of health on utility, the increase in utility from having a higher income when healthy, the marginal expected utility of income, which converts the first two utility effects into income terms, and the expected reduction in the cost of insurance. The growth rate in the value of health is the weighted average of the rate of growth of these factors where the weights in general vary over time.
When there is no productivity gain from better health (so that l and hence I are zero) and health merely has a direct effect on utility then
. The direct effect of better health on utility may vary over time because of the effect of changes in public goods or the environment on utility. The value of health in terms of income grows more rapidly the larger the growth rate of income g and the rate at which marginal utility falls with income ε: both increase the willingness to give up income in exchange for health because reductions in income have a smaller utility consequence.
If there is a productivity gain from better health but no direct effect on utility (
In the simple case in which there is full cover insurance the increase in expected income accrues entirely to the insurance pool and the growth rate of expected income is g since we assume that the endowed income of the sick grows at the same rate as the endowed income of the healthy. If there is incomplete insurance the difference between utility from income when healthy and income when sick decreases so that expected utility gain from better health falls. With income in the unhealthy state proportional to income in the healthy state the expected utility gain falls at the rate (1-ε)g. However, expected marginal utility of income falls even faster at the rate gε, so that the value of additional utility in terms of income grows at the rate g. Hence, whatever the extent of insurance and the sharing of the increases in expected income between the individual and the insurance pool,
there is no direct effect of health on utility. Table 1 summarises the implications of alternative assumptions for the growth in the value of health and the rate of discount on health effects. It makes clear that, in addition to assumptions about social welfare (embodied in ρ and ε), technology and resources (embodied in g), the appropriate rate of discount on health effects in CEA also depends on the impact of ill health on individual income and the extent of insurance.
If utility from income is bounded (ε > 1), as is usually assumed, then, in the limit as income becomes large, the effect of health on income becomes unimportant compared to the direct effect of health on utility, g v tends to k + gε and the discount rate on health tends to ρ − k .
The current English Department of Health recommendation (Department of Health, 1996) , based on Parsonage and Neuburger (1992) , is that health effects be discounted at 1.5% and costs at 6%. A number of authors (for example, Arrow, 1995) have suggested that ρ is around 1% and that ε is about 2. Our results suggest that the recommendation on r c are broadly correct, but they support the particular recommendation on r h only if less obvious further assumptions are made, for example that the value of the direct effect of health on utility is constant and large relative to the value of the effect of health on income.
Conclusions
Our conclusions can be summarised thus
• if it is believed that value of future health effects in terms of future income grows over time, this must be allowed for in CEA and CBA, either directly by adjusting the health effects or indirectly by adjusting the discount rate on health effects • adjusting the health effect has the merits of being explicit and separating out the issues of the value of health effects in monetary terms and the discount rate to be applied to future income
• for cost benefit analysis all health effects should be valued in the income of the period in which they occur and then discounted back to a present value using the rate of discount appropriate for costs
• for cost effectiveness analysis, where health effects cannot be valued in income of the period, the nominal quantity of health effects should be adjusted to a "real" quantity to reflect the growth in the value of future health effects and the same discount rate be applied to costs and "real" health effects
• evaluations should be explicit about the approach taken to discounting health effects and the reasons underlying it, such as assumptions about the growth in the value of health effects The suggestion that the discount rate for health effects should be less than the discount rate for costs because the value of health grows over time is not new. However, the fact that the correct discounting procedure for CEA was recognised but then dismissed in the chapter on discounting by Lipscomb, Weinstein and Torrence in the influential compendium of best practice in health economic evaluations commissioned by the US Public Health Service (Gold et. al., 1996) , the failure to use the correct procedure revealed in published studies, and the incorrect procedures recommended in many official guidelines (Smith and Gravelle, 2000) , suggest that the case needed to be made more firmly. We hope that by using simple explicit models of intertemporal decision making, we have strengthened the case for taking account of the growth in the value of health in economic evaluations. Evaluations based on CEA criteria require estimates of the growth in the value of health and CBA is impossible without estimates of the value of health. Attention should now be turned to the fundamental issue for decision making in health care: the value of health.
Notes
1 Note that interest rates are dimensionless, so that it makes sense to compare the magnitudes of r c and r h . v t has the dimension of income per unit of health, so that v 1 and v 0 can also be compared. 2 The welfare foundations of CEA are discussed in Garber (2000) where it is argued that under certain circumstances CEA can lead to welfare maximising decisions. See also Phelps and Mushlin (1991) . A contrary view has been expressed by Donaldson (1998) who argues that CEA and CBA are attempts to answer different questions, rather than attempts to answer the same question with different amounts of information. He suggests that CBA is concerned with allocative efficiency and CEA with technical efficiency. 3 In a "consistency" argument frequently cited in the debate, Weinstein and Stasson (1977) , r h is zero or negative and the present value of the future perpetual increase in health is infinite 6 The difficulty with the CEA rule is analogous to the problem with comparing the internal rate of return with some target rate of return as a means of taking investment decisions. The internal rate of return rule can lead to correct decisions (ie those which maximise net present value) only in a restricted class of projects (Hirshleifer, 1970, 51-56) . 7 In what follows we investigate the change over time in the value of a given health effect in terms of income of the period in which the effect occurs. We are considering the value of a change occurring to individuals who are the same age at different dates, not the same individual at different ages. van Hout (1998) also uses a welfare framework to derive an expression for the discount rate on health but adopts a social welfare function which is non linear in the health variable, so that it cannot be interpreted as per capita expected utility, and does not allow for increases in per capita income arising from an increase in health. 10 When φ < 1 we assume that income is always greater than the level required to ensure that utility when healthy is greater than utility when diseased at the same income level. 11 Essentially the same results can be derived in more complex settings in which being healthy has a direct effect on marginal utility so that the optimal insurance scheme does not equalise income across states (Gravelle, 2000) . 12 To derive the results in the simple form below we also assume that the possibly suboptimal insurance scheme maintains a constant ratio of individual income in the healthy and unhealthy states and that initially the probability of the healthy state is the same in all periods. 
